I. INTRODUCTION Denying precedential status to unpublished opinions muddles the already unclear law surrounding qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a defense available to government officials accused of civil rights violations.' In fact, it is the most significant and most problematic defense to such claims. 2 By varying in their treatment of unpublished opinions, particularly on the issue of precedent, the federal circuits have added another layer of uncertainty and inequality to this analysis. ' The Supreme Court has aptly cautioned in another context that "[f]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." 4 The federal circuits' nonuniform practices regarding the precedential status of unpublished opinions has increasingly fostered a jurisprudence of doubt. The effect on the qualified immunity analysis is one concrete example of this doubt. This uncertainty should be removed either by granting these opinions precedential status or by recognizing their value in the qualified immunity analysis.
Individuals who have their civil rights violated by state government officials have a right to bring a suit in federal court for relief. 5 The federal statute creating that right, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was drafted to give effect to the recently passed Fourteenth Amendment and to provide an avenue to enforce federal civil rights even in the face of discriminatory state laws, state law enforcement apathy, or state court procedural barriers. 6 The statute allows an injured person to make a claim against the person who injured that person directly, avoiding the sovereign immunity claim that would likely bar a claim against the state government itself. It has since been used to seek redress for the violation of a wide variety of federal rights. 7 Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 8 These actions are very similar, and in regard to the qualified immunity defense, they are identical . ' A government official may raise the defense of qualified immunity in these civil rights actions if the official's actions do not violate a "clearly established" right.1 0 That is, whether the official violated a federal right and whether that right was clearly established at the time."
This type of "good faith" immunity from suit for official acts is a venerable one,' 2 but its exact contours under federal law were arrived at much 340-44 (1986) ; see also SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 5, at 444-45 (describing the Supreme Court's "functional approach in determining whether a particular class ... is entitled to assert an absolute immunity or qualified immunity defense").
11. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 12. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-17 n.8 (1975); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (195 1) (noting that governmental immunity was a "tradition so well grounded in history and reason" as early as 1871).
13. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (requiring only objective good faith and thus rejecting former additional requirement of subjective good faith on the part of the defendant asserting immunity); Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41 (requiring a level of prior notice of the right between abstract formulation and precisely analogous facts).
14. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (requiring only objective good faith and thus rejecting former additional requirement of subjective good faith on the part of the defendant asserting immunity).
15. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that existing cases did not have the requisite factual similarity to the case at bar and demonstrating that the area "is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case"). Similarly, as recently as 2009, the Court altered the test by abandoning a prior decision that required courts to take the qualified immunity questions of constitutional violation and clearly established right in that order. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (departing from a prior ruling in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001) and holding that courts were free to address the allegation of a constitutional injury or the issue of whether the law was clearly established first as they saw fit). Commentators and Justices alike have tended to view the issue of qualified immunity as a threshold issue that should be addressed before proceeding to the constitutional determination. See generally Los remains a challenging one. For example, in each case the court must determine whether the law was clearly established sufficiently to put the officer on notice of the illegality of the action.'
6 Though the Supreme Court has frequently clarified the level of factual similarity between precedent cases and the alleged violation necessary to clearly establish the law, circuit courts have continued to announce varying formulations of how fact-specific the precedent must be." 7 Determining in a given case whether the right is so "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that [his conduct] violates that right" has proven difficult to administer. 8 However, an even more fundamental ambiguity exists that muddles the qualified immunity analysis. ever, the precedential value of these decisions remains uncertain. 28 This ambiguity has a direct and dire effect on the qualified immunity analysis. The inclusion or exclusion of unpublished opinions as evidence of clearly established law may alter the "contours of the right" and the clarity with which an official would understand that the right has been violated.
2 9 Yet, this is exactly the state of the law. Some circuits acknowledge that these decisions are part of the body of law that speak to the establishment of a right while others choose to overlook these decisions and focus only on published authorities. 3 4 7 The purpose of both section 1983 and Bivens actions is to give parties injured by government officials acting under the color of law an avenue to seek redress. 48 However, to prevent government officials from having to defend frivolous lawsuits or those that would chill government officials' good faith exercise of authority, both section 1983 and Bivens actions are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, 4 9 and "the qualified immunity analysis is identical under either cause of action." 50 III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY While some government officials are entitled to absolute immunity for certain official acts, all government officials 5 1 may claim qualified immunity for conduct that "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 5 2 This protection, formerly known as the "good faith" defense, is well-established. was clearly established such that a reasonable official would have known the conduct to be unlawful.
The Supreme Court has since clarified this standard as requiring only that the unlawfulness of the official's acts be apparent and not requiring prior case law be identical or materially similar. In Anderson v.
Creighton, the plaintiff sought damages from FBI agents for the warrantless search of his home in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court clarified that abrogating qualified immunity requires not only that there is a relevant constitutional right in a general sense, but that the contours of that right must be clear enough that a reasonable official would understand that his actions will infringe it. 56 Anderson also held that identical actions need not have previously been held unlawful, but "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 57 In 2002, the Supreme Court again clarified that facts of prior cases need not be "materially similar" 5 8 or "fundamentally similar" 5 9 to clearly establish the law. Even a total lack of precedent is not a guarantee of qualified immunity if the conduct is patently unconstitutional. 6 " That said, factual similarity of prior cases and the clarity of the established law remains a key issue of dispute in qualified immunity cases.61 Qualified immunity is intended to protect government officials who act in good faith in carrying out their duties. The public interest in awarding damages to vindicate constitutional rights must be tempered because "claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole." 62 In its formulation of the modern qualified immunity test, the Supreme Court in Harlow spelled out some of the social costs that militate in favor of a qualified immunity defense: (2004) (relying upon the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment itself as sufficiently establishing that defendant's conduct was unconstitutional); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 ("This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.").
61. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 2, at § 3:6 ("There is considerable disagreement among the circuits as to how precisely the right must be defined in order to determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.").
62. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590 (1998) (" [T] here is a strong public interest in protecting public officials from the costs associated with the defense of damages actions.").
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[Vol. 65: 45 These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties." 6 3 In addition, the lack of such a defense "would deter [an official's] willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good." 6 4 In sum, the public policy underlying qualified immunity includes "attracting competent individuals to public sector jobs, encouraging individuals to serve in elected offices, allowing public officials to exercise unfettered discretion in serving the public good, and avoiding exposing public officials to unnecessary litigation that would distract them from their civic responsibilities." 6 5 Qualified immunity is intended to be an immunity not only from liability but from the suit itself. 66 As the Supreme Court stated in Mitchell v. Forsyth, qualified immunity provides "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability .
*.".
."" For the most part, qualified immunity should be determined early in the litigation to relieve officials entitled to immunity from the burden of discovery and litigation. 68 The social costs that qualified immunity are intended to prevent, i.e., "the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service," 6 9 are only avoided if the determination is made before the defendant is put through the time and expense of trial. Similarly, "Harlow emphasizes that even such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as '[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government."' 7 0 Likewise, unlike most summary judgment rulings, which are interlocutory and not immediately appealable, an order denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is immediately appealable. 7 This inquiry is an objective test, which turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the defendant's actions assessed in light of the law that was clearly established at the time of those actions. 74 That is, whether a reasonable official would have thought that the actions complained of were reasonable (i.e., constitutional) and based on settled law at that time. 75 If reasonable officials could disagree, then the law is not clearly established. 76 The critical inquiry in the qualified immunity analysis is what law was clearly established at the time the defendant official's action was taken. This inquiry requires an examination of the case law, but which cases may be used to determine whether the law is clearly established varies between the circuits. If unpublished opinions are viewed as precedent, they should be used on the same basis as any other circuit decision, but even if they are not, the very characteristics that lead courts to issue them as unpublished makes them ideal for determining the clearly established law.
IV.
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
Unpublished opinions are not inherently non-precedential, and even if treated as non-precedential, they are by definition evidence of clearly established law. Whether unpublished opinions have precedent, as some argue, 77 they are undeniably evidence of clearly established law given the publication standards in place in the circuits. 78 that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment."). Throughout English and American history, whether an opinion was published was not determinative of its precedential value. That is, even decisions that were difficult for litigants to find could still be brought to a court's attention and urged as precedent laid down to be followed, distinguished, or overruled. 79 In the mid-1970s, however, to deal with the growing volume of case law in the federal appellate courts, a committee of the federal judiciary created an odd distinction in federal cases that had not been present in common law in England or America. 8° That distinction was that some cases would be published and citeable and others would be unpublished and unciteable. This essentially created a body of unpublished opinions 8 ' with traits (non-citeable and non-precedent) unlike any in common law history. 82 While the Committee's recommendation claimed to have dealt only with whether an unpublished case could be cited as precedent and not whether it was precedent, 8 3 this was a distinction without a difference. The 1973 Committee plainly or modifies an existing rule of law, or calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been generally overlooked"); 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(1) (whether an opinion "establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law, or applies an established rule to a novel fact situation" is one criterion to be considered in "determining whether a decision will be designated for publication"); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a) ( When faced with the question of whether this new class of decisions would be precedent, it chose not to examine the issue, its constitutionality, or its practicality, calling it a "morass of jurisprudence." However, removing these decisions from the body of precedent, without ever reflecting on the jurisprudential impact of doing so causes numerous inequities and significant confusion. The unclear status of these unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis is just one of these negative effects on the body of law. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 20.
81. Though labeled "unpublished opinions," these opinions are published, not only online but also in printed volumes, such as West's Federal Appendix. This is due in large part to the continuous use of these opinions by practitioners and judges-despite the opinions' citation propriety or precedential status. See Cleveland, supra note 25, at 88, 161.
82. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 22-23 (proposing the model rule on publication which contravened the common law tradition); see also Cleveland, supra note 25, at 84-87 ("[D]eclaring decisions to be unciteable, and moreover, not precedent, was contrary to the entire history of the common law system.").
83. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 25, at 20-21 ("recommend[ing] adoption" of an alternative delineated "[unpublished] opinions may not be cited to support arguments or statements of law, i.e., as precedent, and nothing is said about precedential value").
understood that removing a decision from publication and citation effectively removed it from the body of precedent as well as from view. In fact, it relied on this "correspondence of publication and precedential value on the one hand, and of non-publication and non-precedential value on the other,"' 84 to avoid examining the precedent issue in greater detail. With the recently approved Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure returning these decisions to the body of citeable law, the correspondence may work in reverse-once citeable, they must also be treated as precedent.1 5 However, that has not yet occurred.
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The idea that some cases could be decided by unpublished opinions was intended as a safety valve to relieve some of the pressure caused by the volume of cases flowing through the federal courts. 87 The safety valve has burst; roughly 84% of cases decided by the circuit courts are decided by unpublished opinions. 88 Federal appellate law is almost entirely made up of unpublished opinions. The sheer number of unpublished decisions, and the percentage of our appellate law that they make up, demands a clearer status and also a more equal one.
In the context of the qualified immunity analysis, particularly in whether they may "clearly establish" the law, there are three aspects of unpublished opinions that make them particularly suited for this purpose. First, unpublished opinions are supposed to be the easy cases-the cases that are mere applications of well-settled law to new facts. 89 The whole notion of an unpublished opinion is based on the idea that some cases make new law (and should be published) and others merely apply the existing law to new facts so similar to the old that it does not expand or contract the law. 90 The publication guidelines found in the local rule or internal operating procedures of most circuits, patterned after the 1973 Committee's recommendation, express this idea: To be unpub- . But see 2D CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1(a) (stating as a publication guideline only that "when a decision in a case is unanimous and each panel judge believes that no jurisprudential purpose is served by an opinion (i.e., a ruling having precedential effect), the panel may rule by summary order" instead of by opinion); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (giving guidance limited to "[a]n opinion, whether signed or per curiam, that appears to have value only to the trial court or the parties is designated as not precedential and is not printed as a slip opinion but, unless otherwise provided by the court, it is posted on the court's internet website. A not precedential opinion may be issued without regard to whether the panel's decision is unanimous and without regard to whether the panel affirms, reverses, or grants other relief."); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that the default is not to publish without guidelines for publication, i.e., "[a]n opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.") The Seventh Circuit had a very detailed publication guideline rule in place prior to the The publication of opinions that merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession. However, opinions that may in any way interest persons other than the parties to a case should be published. Therefore, an opinion is published if it:
(b) Applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those in previous published opinions applying the rule.
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In short, the law in unpublished opinibns is by definition clearly established; if it were not, the decision would be ineligible for unpublished status. It is a fundamental premise of the concept of unpublished opinions that they do not make new law but only apply the established law. 97 Ignoring unpublished decisions is ignoring the best evidence of
The following criteria shall be considered by panels in determining whether a decision will be designated for publication in the Federal Reporter: (1) whether it establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law, or applies an established rule to a novel fact situation; (2) whether it creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within the circuit or between this circuit and another; (3) whether it discusses a legal or factual issue of continuing public interest; (4) whether it is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion; (5) whether it reverses the decision below, unless:
(A) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or, (B) the reversal is a remand (without further comment) to the district court of a case reversed or remanded by the Supreme Court; (6) whether it addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision that has been published; or, (7) whether it is a decision that has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Third, the sheer number of unpublished opinions, and the fact that understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.").
100. BROWN & KINPORTS, supra note 19, at 112 ("In the twenty-five years since Harlow was decided, the federal courts have never agreed on the extent to which [a] plaintiffs case must be factually similar to the relevant precedents .... ). 101. In both Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, and United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1997), the Supreme Court analogized the kind of notice government officials should be given in the qualified immunity context to the concept of fair notice in the criminal law context, i.e., where a government official is charged with acting "'willfully' and under color of law to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution" under 18 U.S.C. § 242. law, unpublished opinions should be the best data points for putative plaintiffs, government officials, and courts to use in determining whether the law was sufficiently clear and whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently proscribed.1 02 This body of opinions, which has the two key characteristics needed to improve the qualified immunity analysis, should not be omitted.1 0 3 Even a few such opinions could aid in determining what the law was and what it said about the government official's conduct, but the fact that such opinions make up 84% of the federal case law suggests that to decide "clearly established law" in the absence of such decisions is to be myopic in the extreme. To determine what law was clearly established without reference to 84% of that law seems as impossible as determining the picture on a puzzle face with only 16% of the pieces." Even if those pieces are the most important ones, it is the aggregate that makes up the full picture. Even if the importance of the 16% of federal appellate decisions that are published is conceded because they are the only cases changing or establishing the law in a meaningful way, the other 84% that are unpublished must represent the applications of settled law. This 84% makes up the bulk of what a putative plaintiff or government official ought to be concerned with, not a body of law that should be cast aside. Ignoring unpublished decisions is ignoring the vast majority of federal case law and viewing the tapestry of clearly established law from only its most unusual threads.
Unpublished opinions are not only useful in determining what law is clearly established, they are uniquely situated within the federal law to do so. The sheer number of applications of settled law to differing, but 102. For example, under Sixth Circuit Rule 206(a) noted above, no decision that: (1) establishes a new rule of law; (2) alters or modifies an existing rule of law; (3) creates or resolves a conflict or authority either within the circuit or between this circuit and another; or (4) discusses a legal or factual issue of continuing public interest, should be unpublished.
103. This is true even if it is agreed that these decisions lack some characteristic, such as expanding or contracting the law, that genuinely makes them of lesser value than published opinions. Unpublished decisions, as applications of settled law, make them especially well-suited to aid in the qualified immunity analysis. That said, there is certainly an argument to be made that unpublished opinions, like every common law decision, do add to the body of law and ought to be considered precedent for a whole host of reasons. See generally Cleveland, supra note 25, at 176. While granting unpublished decisions precedential value is the most straightforward, and most jurisprudentially sound, way to resolve the muddling of the qualified immunity analysis, this article takes the federal judiciary's claims about the nature of unpublished opinions at face value in order to more readily persuade it to use them in qualified immunity analysis.
104. This phenomenon has been described with many metaphors including analogizing the common law to a "pointillist painting" with each case representing an individual point. not too differing, facts, makes them ideal for telling the parties what the law expects and prohibits. Whether viewed from the perspective of an injured party, a government official trying to discern the best course of action, or a reviewing judge assessing whether the law was clearly established, more decisions showing the law applied to specific facts is better than fewer decisions. All parties are better able to judge the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest, for example, if given a dozen cases evaluating prior searches rather than two.' 0 5 Moreover, even if unpublished opinions are not viewed as precedential, and therefore unable to clearly establish the law themselves, by their very nature they are evidence that law is clearly established.1 0 6 Unfortunately, like their treatment of unpublished opinions generally, the federal circuits vary in their use of unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis. This muddles the substantive test for qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has refused to restrict the sources of law that may clearly establish the law to its own decisions, refusing to adopt "a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a matter of law" to clearly establish the law.' 0 8 It has likewise referred to a variety of opinions, including appellate, district, unpublished, and state court decisions in examining whether the law was clearly established.1 09 In addition, it has attempted to allay circuit fears regarding the use of persuasive authority:
[1]n applying the rule of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
105. These numbers were not chosen arbitrarily. Two out of twelve cases represent slightly more than 16%-the percentage of federal appellate decisions that are actually published annually. See 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 88.
106. To argue otherwise would be to admit unpublished opinions are being used to make sui generis decisions not justified by settled law, an argument that while it has some support, is an untenable position for the federal judiciary itself to take.
107 The Supreme Court's own decisions clearly establish the law stated in them, and the circuits uniformly agree that their own binding decisions apply to qualified immunity cases within their circuit.' 3 But whether decisions of sister circuits, unpublished decisions, district court decisions, or state court decisions, may play a role in clearly establishing the law varies from circuit to circuit. Given the special nature of unpublished opinions that makes them particularly well-suited to demonstrating clearly established law, the following survey of the circuits pays special attention to how the circuits treat those opinions.
A. Circuits that Are Silent on the Issue (1st, 5th, 8th, & D.C.)
Four circuits, the First, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C., are completely silent on whether unpublished opinions may be used to clearly establish the law. In three circuits, the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh, unpublished opinions have been soundly rejected as evidence of whether the law was clearly established." 7 The Fourth Circuit held, in a trio of cases in the 1990s, that unpublished opinions do not clearly establish the law because they are not precedent. In Torcasio v. Murray, the plaintiff, a morbidly obese man, alleged that prison officials violated his rights precedent, its date, its persuasive force, and its level of factual similarity to the facts before this 116. One might speculate that they would not consider them given their circuit rules denying precedent, Local Rule 36.0(a) and Local Rule 32.1A, respectively. However, this direct correlation of precedent to use in the qualified immunity analysis is belied by the Ninth Circuit, which was historically the most adverse to according unpublished opinions citation or precedent. Yet, the Ninth Circuit has traditionally considered unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis. See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 714 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a]bsent binding precedent, we look to all available decisional law, including the law of other circuits and district courts, to determine whether the right was clearly established").
117. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 124 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), affid, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (" [W] e are loathe to cite to unpublished opinions, see Local Rule 36(c), nor will we consider them to be evidence that a right is or is not clearly established."); Hogan, 85 F.3d at 1118 ("Since unpublished opinions are not even regarded as binding precedent in our circuit, such opinions cannot be considered in deciding whether particular conduct violated clearly established law for purposes of adjudging entitlement to qualified immunity."); Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[C]itation of unpublished opinions seems an unusually ineffective, and even counterproductive, means of demonstrating that a given proposition of law was 'clearly established.' ").
under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying his requests for special prison accommodations." 8 The Fourth Circuit harshly disapproved of the plaintiffs citation to unpublished opinions to prove that the right was clearly established," 9 stating: "We generally look with disfavor upon citation of unpublished dispositions S... as citation of unpublished opinions seems an unusually ineffective, and even counterproductive, means of demonstrating that a given proposition of law was 'clearly established.' ",120 The Fourth Circuit reiterated this perspective in Hogan v. Carter, in which it stated:
Since unpublished opinions are not even regarded as binding precedent in our circuit, such opinions cannot be considered in deciding whether particular conduct violated clearly established law for purposes of adjudging entitlement to qualified immunity. We could not allow liability to be imposed upon public officials based upon unpublished opinions that we ourselves have determined will be binding only upon the parties immediately before the court.121 Similarly, in Wilson v. Layne, the Fourth Circuit held that unpublished opinions, as non-precedents, could not be used to clearly establish the law.1 2 2 Whether the Circuit has wavered from this highly restrictive rule after the Supreme Court's review and rejection of a categorical rule against using non-binding sources is unclear.
The Seventh Circuit also ties the issue of whether unpublished decisions may be used to demonstrate clearly established law to their status as non-binding precedent. It seems logical that repeated decisions refusing to recognize a right would be evidence that the right was not clearly established even if the opinions were unpublished. However, it is well known that judges may put considerably less effort into opinions that they do not intend to publish. Because these opinions will not be binding precedent in any court, a judge may be less careful about his legal analysis, especially when dealing with a novel issue of law. For this reason we are loathe to cite to unpublished opinions, see Local Rule 36(c), nor will we consider them to be evidence that a right is or is not clearly established. Id. at 124 n.6. This comment, in a single footnote, suggests that a majority of Fourth Circuit judges believed that unpublished opinions were being used to deal with novel issues of law and perhaps carelessly so.
123. Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Taken together with other evidence, [unpublished opinions] might show that the law had been clearly established. But by themselves they cannot clearly establish the law because . . . they are not authoritative as precedent.").
disapproval of unpublished, non-binding authority as clearly establishing a right.1 24 In Anderson v. Romero, the plaintiff was a prison inmate who became infected with the AIDS virus while confined in a state penitentiary.
1 25 The plaintiff brought suit against prison officials under section 1983, alleging that the prison officials caused him to be put in an isolated cell and denied him various privileges because of his HIV-positive status.1 26 In conducting a qualified immunity analysis, the court stated "that district court decisions cannot clearly establish a constitutional right," reasoning that such decisions "by themselves ... cannot clearly establish the law because, while they bind the parties by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata, they are not authoritative as precedent."'1
27
In dicta, the Seventh Circuit applied this reasoning to unpublished decisions of the circuit court, stating, "[t]he unpublished decisions of this court have no weight as precedent. . . . although we cannot find any cases on the point, we are confident that an unpublished decision cannot elevate the decision that it affirms to the status of circuit precedent."'' claim against the sheriff for injuries they received at the hands of fellow prisoners. 132 In its discussion of how factually similar precedent cases must be, the court opined that it would look only to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and decisions of the highest court of the relevant state.
1 33 The Court rejected any reading of Wilson v. Layne that would permit a "consensus of cases of persuasive authority" to clearly establish the law.
1 34 Its reasoning for this was that "[e]ach jurisdiction has its own body of law, and splits between jurisdictions on matters of law are not uncommon." 135 This reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, such splits of authority would serve to indicate that the law is not clearly established, and the lack of a split would bolster the case in favor of clearly established law. Second, when it comes to federally guaranteed civil rights, uniformity should be seen as a goal, particularly for section 1983 and Bivens actions, which were intended to give effect to federal rights across the country.
The Fourth and Seventh Circuit rules regarding the use of unpublished opinions may be different post-Wilson, but there is no case law yet to indicate that. It is possible that they will follow the Eleventh Circuit's unabashed restrictive approach, which allows only binding authority to be used in the qualified immunity analysis. For the Eleventh Circuit's part, unpublished opinions hold no sway in determining whether the law was clearly established and are unlikely to do so absent an en banc or Supreme Court mandate.
C. Circuits Where Unpublished Opinions Likely Cannot Be Used To Show Clearly Established Law (2nd & 10th)
In two circuits, the Second and Tenth, it is most likely that unpublished opinions may not be used to clearly establish the law.' 36 some doubt on their willingness to look to unpublished opinions in determining whether the law was clearly established. The Second Circuit has made only vague statements about its treatment of opinions in the qualified immunity determination. In Cerrone v. Brown, the court was faced with the question of whether the law requiring probable cause to detain and question a police officer was clearly established." 3 7 The investigating officers claimed that probable cause was unnecessary because Cerrone was a police officer-a government employee-and being investigated for conduct related to his employment." 3 8 The defendants offered an unpublished district court opinion, which had been affirmed by an unpublished table decision, but the court found it unavailing, noting via parenthetical that "only Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent are relevant to whether a right is clearly established."'' 3 9 However, in Tellier v. Fields, a Bivens action decided one year prior to Cerrone, the Second Circuit did not rule out the use of unpublished opinions entirely."4° In Tellier, the plaintiff argued that he was held by federal officials in administrative detention without review hearings, which violated his constitutional rights. 14 "' In an attempt to demonstrate that this right was not clearly established, the defendants relied upon many unpublished opinions from "distant circuits."' 4 2 While the court refused to view them as convincing, it did so based on their distance and lack of relevance rather than their status as unpublished decisions.' 43 In fact, the court seemed open to the use of non-binding law, which would include unpublished opinions, as long as they "clearly foreshadow"' 4 4 a certain ruling, stating, "the absence of a decision by this court or the Supreme Court directly addressing the right at issue 'will not preclude a finding that the law was clearly established '.... "9145 In the face of these two decisions, neither of which makes a definitive statement and each of which points in a different direction, it is difficult to determine the Second Circuit's rule on the use of unpublished opinions in the qualified immunity analysis. Given that the Cerrone decision is more recent and more directly confronts the issue, it is likely that the Second Circuit will not look to unpublished opinions for clearly established law. will at least consider them in determining whether the law was clearly established.
1
The Sixth Circuit has a single strong declaration and defense of using unpublished opinions to determine whether the law is clearly established,16 2 but dicta in other cases weaken that strong stance. 163 The Sixth Circuit opinion in McCloud v. Testa contains the most well-reasoned statement by a federal appellate court of why unpublished opinions should be used to determine clearly established law, while other Sixth Circuit opinions imply that such opinions should not be used because they are not binding statements of law."6 In McCloud v. Testa, the plaintiffs, former government employees, brought a section 1983 claim alleging violations of their First Amendment right to be free from dismissal based on their political affiliation.1 65 A critical question in that case was whether the positions plaintiffs held were the types of jobs for which political affiliation was a reasonable part of the job qualification and whether the law was clearly established on that point.1 6 6 While normally dismissal based on political affiliation would violate the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in Branti v. Finkel carved out an exception for jobs where political affiliation was a reasonable part of the job qualification.1 67 The Sixth Circuit reviewed Supreme Court decisions, Sixth Circuit published decisions, and a trio of unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions to determine that the law was clearly established. 168 Anticipating that some may view the court's use of unpublished opinions in determining whether the law was clearly established as "problematic," the court explained its reason for doing so at length. 1 69 First, the court explained that because unpublished opinions, by definition, represent the well-settled law, "cases the court properly decides not to designate for publication should generally be uncontroversial and establish no new 161 precedent."'' 7 0 Second, the court notes that the unpublished opinions serve as additional applications of that settled law in a manner that is very helpful to determine where the case at bar falls into existing law:
The unpublished cases we cite only serve as real-life examples to demonstrate that some job positions can be situated with relative ease in relation to the Branti exception. This reinforces the point we make below at greater length that, in many cases, there need not be an opinion specifically addressing the job position at issue in a particular case before it is possible to conclude that this position is clearly within or outside of the Branti exception. 17 '
The Sixth Circuit panel in McCloud recognized that more data points make for a clearer, more reliable, and more useful picture of the state of the law. In addition, the court rejected the notion that the lesser precedential status of unpublished opinions made them any less suitable for determining what law was clearly established:
[W]e offer a number of examples below about jobs that can be clearly positioned in relation to the Branti exception. These citations to unpublished cases can be considered as having only the same persuasive force as the hypothetical examples we have devised. We think, however, that unpublished opinions, because they show how our court dealt with concrete disputes, are more persuasive than the purely hypothetical examples we have invented and so merit consideration.
172
The court here recognized that whatever precedential value, or lack thereof, accorded unpublished decisions, they reflect actual judgments by a panel of the circuit that should be used to judge actions that follow them. This well-reasoned decision, and the sensible use of unpublished opinions it makes, has never been directly contradicted. However, opinions both before and after it have suggested a more restrictive standard. For example, in Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, the court seemed to require binding authority,'
73 which unpublished opinions in the Sixth Circuit traditionally are not. 174 Likewise, in Bell v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit stated that a number of unpublished decisions, and a published decision that cited them, were contrary to the great weight of published authority and therefore ineffective in clearly establishing the law. 175 While this decision is clear that unpublished opinions are insufficient in the face of clearly established published law to the contrary, the implication is made that because they are not precedent, they cannot clearly establish the law. 176 Despite these opinions implying otherwise, the Sixth Circuit seems to permit the use of unpublished opinions in determining clearly established law.
177
While neither the Third nor Sixth Circuit has the most unequivocal position on the use of unpublished opinions in this context, it seems most likely that each permits, and will continue to permit, citation to unpublished opinions as part of the analysis.
E. The Circuit Where Unpublished Opinions Can Be Used To Show Clearly Established Law (9th)
Only the Ninth Circuit has unequivocally stated a willingness to use unpublished opinions to assess whether the law was clearly established. 1 78 The Ninth Circuit follows an expansive approach to determining clearly established law, which includes reference to "all decisional 177. This is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's willingness to look at other persuasive authority, such as the law of other circuits, in determining whether the law is clearly established. See Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) ("In inquiring whether a constitutional right is clearly established, we must 'look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits.').
178. The Ninth Circuit repeatedly approved of this use of all decisional law, including unpublished opinions, in determining clearly established law, 185 and unlike the Sixth Circuit, there are no restrictive cases to cast doubt on the Circuit's view of the issue. Indeed, evidence suggests that government officials in the Ninth Circuit look to unpublished opinions, in addition to published ones, in setting policy to avoid infringing others' constitutional rights. 186 In Bahrampour v. Lampert, Oregon Department of Corrections ("ODC") officials argued to the trial court that their conduct was reasonable and that they were entitled to qualified immunity in part because they had looked to the Ninth Circuit's unpublished opinions on the issue in crafting prison regulations. The court stated: "The district court determined that in forming its regulations, ODC properly relied on unpublished opinions, despite their lack of binding precedential effect. ODC argues before this Court that unpublished decisions can be considered in determining whether the law was clearly established. We agree." 187
Prior to the passage of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, the Ninth Circuit was perhaps the most restrictive regarding citation and use of unpublished opinions, 1 88 yet it has been nearly alone in its care-fully reasoned distinction between precedential value and utility in demonstrating clearly established law.
VI. CONCLUSION: UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHOULD BE USED IN

DETERMINING THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW
Unpublished opinions should be used to determine if the law is clearly established. This is true whether or not they are accorded any precedential status. If unpublished opinions are merely applications of well-settled law to facts that do not require any expansion or retraction of the scope of law, then they are ideal sources for determining what law is clearly established in the "fact-specific" manner called for by the qualified immunity test.' 8 9 Unpublished decisions are by definition applications of settled law; they apply that law to factual settings that again, by virtue of qualifying for an unpublished opinion, are routine rather than questionable. Finally, the volume of unpublished opinions means that they can provide additional data for all parties to judge their conduct that is simply unavailable from the relatively small number of published opinions.
In addition to these reasons, which follow from the very nature of unpublished decisions, there are other reasons for a uniform rule requiring the use of unpublished opinions in clearly establishing the law. First, drawing only from the relatively small number of published decisions means that the contours of the rights and government officials' knowledge of the lawfulness of their conduct are less clear. Fewer cases yield fewer applications of the law, which means a greater level of abstraction and less certainty about the scope of constitutional rights. This area of law in particular would benefit from greater certainty. Second, variation among circuits may lead to varying civil rights and qualified immunity protections depending upon the level of abstraction at which these rights are viewed. This variation works a particular hardship on the organizations of government officials that operate across multiple circuits, such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons, because they are subject to differing standards-and in many circuits cannot even know what sources of law 
